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This paper analyzes productivity levels, dispersion and growth in the Bolivian Manufacturing 
Sector during the Market Liberalization Period: 1988-2001. These years are characterized first, 
by a period of macroeconomic stabilization and 1
st Generation Reforms (1988-1993), second, by 
a period of privatization and 2
nd Generation Reforms (1994-1997) and third, by a Post-reforms 
period (1998-2001). The 1
st and 2
nd Generation Reforms were framed in line with the 
Washington Consensus and their main objectives were to guarantee macroeconomic stability, to 
improve the efficiency and allocation of resources in the economy and to promote economic 
growth with fairness. We show that in contrast to what was expected, productivity in the 
manufacturing sector decreased steadily. We compute Total Factor Productivity (TFP), for the 
first time, using firm-level data and in addition we break down this measure in productivity per 
se and resource misallocation. We find that both issues contributed to the decline in productivity 
and if resource misallocation were eliminated, the gains in productivity would have been in the 
order of 60 percent, but the trend of productivity along time would have been the same, which 
means that there are also structural problems that affect productivity in Bolivia. In addition, we 
evaluate TFP considering exporting firms, size of firms, age of firms and geographical location. 
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The Manufacturing Industry is the economic activity with a major participation in Bolivia’s 
GDP. In the 1990’s it averaged 17 percent of GDP, employed 18 percent of the urban population 
and contributed 31 percent to the total value of exports. However, in comparison with other Latin 
American countries, the Bolivian industry’s share with respect to GDP was one of the lowest. 
Most countries’ Manufacturing Industry shares of GDP were over 30 percent. 
In the 70’s and until the beginning of the 80’s, the industry was characterized by a high 
level of protection by means of high tariffs, quantitative restrictions, participation of large public 
companies that operated in captive markets, industries adapted to the internal market financed in 
their majority by national development banks and generalized subsidies. Until the middle of the 
80’s, Bolivia’s development model was based on a State Capitalism where the State participated 
directly in the manufacturing activities.  
Since August 1985, due to the application of the “New Economic Policy (NEP)” several 
changes took place in Bolivia and in particular in the manufacturing sector, from which we 
emphasize: the financial and commercial liberalization, the reduction of fiscal resources for 
technology, less institutional support for industries, stimulus for the internal and external 
competition, elimination of subsidies and the foresight of the privatization process of public 
enterprises. This new view favored an increased role for markets and the private sector in the 
economy with the corresponding withdrawal of the State’s direct involvement in producing 
goods and services. In this period the informal sector also expanded due to an increase in the rate 
of unemployment brought about by the Stabilization Plan. 
In the 90’s the privatization of public enterprises took place. Garrón et.al. (2003) 
characterize the Bolivian privatization process in two modalities and three waves. The two 
modalities were traditional or standard privatization, and capitalization. The three waves, 
associated with three different governments, refer to periods in which a push was given to the 
privatization effort. The first wave started in 1992 with the enactment of the Privatization Law. 
The second wave, which introduced “Capitalization”, the Bolivian bred scheme of transferring 
firms to the private sector, began in 1995. Finally, the third wave, which again privatized State 
Owned Enterprises in a standard fashion, started in 1998.  
The NEP was also part of a broader structural adjustment program aimed at changing the 
whole function of the economy by reducing the influence of the state on production, increasing 5 
 
reliance on the price system in the different markets (goods, labor and capital), and promoting 
private sector initiatives. As Jemio (2001) indicates, the framework of incentives adopted under 
the NEP included free convertibility of foreign exchange, elimination of price controls, reduced 
government intervention in labor contracts, financial liberalization and commitment to price 
stability. All these actions were designed to encourage greater private sector participation in the 
economy and to increase productivity in the industrial sector.  
In summary, the period of 1988-2001 is a period where the development strategy of the 
Bolivian economy evolved from an inward examination, based on excessive state 
interventionism, towards an outward looking orientation, with more reliance on markets as 
resource allocation mechanisms and exports as the growth engine. In this paper, we analyze in 
detail if all the transformations that occurred in the period of market liberalization had an impact 
on productivity dynamics in Bolivia. The results show that they were unsuccessful in improving 
the productivity in the manufacturing sector. Contrary to the expectations involved with the 
reforms, productivity, measured as Total Factor Productivity (TFP), showed an annual 
accumulative rate of growth of -9.3 percent in the whole period.   
To analyze the reforms in detail, we separate the whole period in three sub-periods. The 
first period goes from 1988 to 1993 which is the stabilization period and where all the 1
st 
Generation reforms, above mentioned, were reinforced. The second period goes from 1994 to 
1997 where new reforms (2
nd Generation Reforms) were implemented. These reforms include: 
the program of capitalization of state enterprises, the reform of the pension system, an education 
sector reform and an administrative reform of decentralization of public expenditure programs 
through the “popular participation” and “decentralization” laws. The third period goes from 1998 
to 2001 and we call it the Post reforms period which is characterized by the beginning of the 
crisis in part as reflection of the Brazilian crisis first and then the Argentinean crisis.
1 
One contribution of the paper and stressed by the new literature on productivity analysis 
(see Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2008)) is that one important explanation for the productivity gap 
in Bolivia is resource misallocation. Aggregate TFP is affected both by the underlying 
distribution of firms’ productivities and the allocation of resources, i.e. capital and labor across 
firms. So, misallocation of capital and labor arises as a result of distortions (market or policy 
                                                 
1 In fact, in Bolivia the crisis reached its peak in 2003 and it was not only an economic crisis, but also a severe social 
crisis. 6 
 
distortions). We show that by removing those distortions, the gains in productivity would have 
been on average in the order of 60 percent for the whole period and in comparison with the US 
these relative gains would have been 11.5 percent on average.  
Besides documenting the level, dispersion and growth of total factor productivity (TFP) 
across formal firms and industries in the period 1988-2001, we analyze productivity differences 
among exporting and non-exporting firms. We study also if productivity depends on 
geographical location, for instance, if firms located in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz are 
more productive than those located in other Departments. We show that productivity is 
significantly different among large, medium, small and micro firms, and finally we analyze the 
relation between productivity and age of the firm. The results of a multiple regression confirm 
that the main characteristic that explains the distribution of productivity across firms is the size 
of the firm, where large firms tend to be more productive. The analysis also shows that 
misallocation of capital and labor is independent of any characteristics of the firms.  
We undertake this productivity documentation study using the unique firm-level data set 
available in Bolivia, which is the Annual Manufacturing Survey, implemented by the National 
Institute of Statistics (INE) between the years 1988-2001. This survey is a complete panel data of 
Bolivian formal firms. We apply the same methodology used by Hsieh and Klenow (2008) to 
make inferences about the degree of factor market and product market distortions, both at the 
industry and manufacturing levels. This methodology allows us to generate summary statistics 
that are comparable with other country studies and in particular with U.S which is our 
benchmark country.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II we present a brief literature review 
covering all the studies that analyze productivity in the manufacturing sector in Bolivia. In 
section III we describe the policies and reforms that could account for the level and evolution of 
distortions. Section IV describes the empirical implementation of the Hsieh and Klenow (2008) 
model (data and descriptive statistics). In section V we show the evolution of TFP, we quantify 
the drag or boost in productivity due to misallocation of resources (productivity gains) and we 





II. Literature Review on Productivity in Bolivia 
This section presents a brief literature review on productivity analysis in Bolivia. We want to 
stress that productivity per se has been rarely analyzed in Bolivia under a macro perspective and 
in particular under a micro perspective. In fact, most of the literature concentrates in analyzing 
the industrialization process through a sectorial perspective, but it does not penetrate into a firm 
analysis. Certainly, most of the studies were aimed in searching the appropriate industrial policy 
for the permanently desired industrialization process.  
Machicado (1986) using data from the National Accounts and the Input-Output Matrix 
evaluates the different industrial sectors and proposes an alternative policy to accelerate the 
industrialization development. Cobas (1987) develops a study for the implementation of a 
strategy for the industrial development. The study was part of an agreement of the Inter 
American Development Bank with the Bolivian Government and covers the most detailed 
explanation of the sectorial structure of the Bolivian industry.  
In the 1990’s the Bolivian authors began to use econometric techniques to analyze 
industrial issues, employing aggregated data by industrial sectors (at 2, 3 and 4 digits of ISIC). 
Valverde (1994) estimates a production function for the manufacturing sector using energy 
inputs instead of the traditional capital and labor inputs. He employs a simple OLS regression 
and although he finds important relations between output and energy usage, he concludes that a 
production function based on capital and labor inputs could explain better and provide more 
elements to analyze industrialization and to formulate policy recommendations. Antelo (1995), 
using data from the Private System of Industrial Information, analyzes market structures, 
competitiveness and industrialization constraints as credit constraints, regulation and external 
markets, for industrial and agro-industrial branches at 2 and 4 digits of ISIC.  
Antelo and Dorado (1996) employ a multivariate analysis and a factorial analysis to study 
the microeconomic factors that affect the development of the industrial sector in Bolivia. They 
use the Annual Manufacturing Survey for the periods 1988-1992 using also aggregated 
information by economic activity. Chavez and Dorado (1996) and Muriel (1999) employ 
univariate analysis using the Physical Volume Index (IVF). The first authors model the 
stochastic process of this series under transitory and permanent shocks, while the second author 
decomposes the series in its cyclical and trend components.  8 
 
Recently, in the 2000’s as part of the evaluations of the economic reforms implemented 
in the 1990’s, some papers appear that analyze productivity. A nice review of productivity issues 
can be found in Jemio and Antelo (2000) where there are special chapters devoted to the analysis 
of productivity in telecommunications industry, the electric energy industry, the hydrocarbons 
industry and the agricultural sector. It is of particular importance for the present study the chapter 
7 of that book, where the relation between reforms, growth, technical progress and employment 
is analyzed. 
The first work that uses firm-level data in Bolivia is the paper of Jiménez and Landa 
(2004). They evaluate the labor performance of small and mid sized firms between 1995 and 
1999 and present the basic elements that explain the dynamic of the labor market and the 
constraints for labor creation in Bolivia. In addition they estimate the coefficients of the factors 
of production from a basic production function. They also estimate a demand function for non-
qualified workers. Their main conclusion is that the employment creation depends heavily on the 
economic expansion of firms that already operate in the market, and on new investments, but 
conditional on the levels of productivity and efficiency in the usage of factors. 
Finally, in 2006, under the initiative of “Maestrias para el Desarrollo” of the Bolivian 
Catholic University and with the support of the Foundation for Production (FUNDAPRO), a 
research program was launched to develop a productive vision for Bolivia, with the intention to 
include it in the new Constitution. From this program, the papers of Perez de Rada (2006) and 
Nina and Von Vacano (2006) are highlighted. In particular, the latter constitutes a comparative 
study with other countries where labor productivity is analyzed by industry, by size and by 
export markets.    
Although the work by Jiménez and Landa (2004) use firm-level data and compute TFP 
using a frontier production function, they do not analyze in deep the issue of total factor 
productivity in Bolivia. They just perform this calculation as an extension of their labor analysis. 
In addition, the other works employ aggregated data by economic activity and do not analyze 
multifactor productivity. Therefore the study that we propose will be the first of its type in 
analyzing total factor productivity in detail.
2  
 
                                                 
2 There are many descriptive publications about the industrial sector and industrial policy in Bolivia. See, for 
example Escobar de Pabón and Kruse (2002) and Lazo (2005). A detailed review can be found also in Machicado 
(2006).  9 
 
III. Structural Reforms in Bolivia 
According to Antelo (2000), the structural reforms implemented in Bolivia were framed in line 
with the Washington Consensus and aimed to guarantee macroeconomic stability, to improve the 
efficiency and allocation of resources in the economy and to promote economic growth with 
fairness. Among the various reforms the highlights were the commercial and financial reforms, 
public sector reforms, the labor market reforms and the incorporation of the environment as a 
key variable in the design and formulation of governmental policies. The main objective of these 
reforms was to boost a sustainable development of the country.  
The seed of these reforms was the stabilization policy implemented since 1985 with the 
enactment of the D.S. 21060 and became known as the New Economic Policy (NPE for its 
initials in Spanish). The NPE had two basic objectives: i) to stabilize prices eliminating the 
hyperinflation in order to build up the base for an economic recovery with sustainable growth 
and ii) to restore the external solvency from a development model based in the market forces to 
allocate resources in the economy, and the openness of the country.  
The following table based on Barja (2000) summarizes the structural reforms, the 
economic policy and other events that characterized the hereafter called the market liberalization 
period in Bolivia.  
Table 1: Periods of the Structural Reforms 
1986-1989 
Economic Stabilization and 
1
st Generation Reforms 
1989-1993 





nd Generation Reforms 
1998-2001 
Post Reforms 
-Exchange rate alignment 
-Commercial policies in favor 
of exports 
-Liberalization of interest 
rates and the financial market 
-Liberalization of the markets 
of consumption goods. 




-Reduction and control of 
public expenditures 
-Foreign debt negotiations   
-Investment Law in favor of 
foreign investment 
-Privatization Law and first 
wave of privatizations 
-SAFCO Law seeking 
efficiency in the public 
sector 
-Education reform and the 
start of long-run social 
policies 
-New Tax Code 
-New Mining Code 
-ESAF accord with the IMF 
-Capitalization Law and 
second wave of 
privatizations 
-SIRESE Law and Laws 
of Telecom, Electricity 
and Hydrocarbons 




-INRA Law to promote 




-Constitutional Reform  
-Third wave of 
privatizations 
  Source: Barja (2000) 
Escobar de Pabón and Kruse (2002) characterize Bolivia as a “precocious reformer”. 
Since 1985, with the application of the structural adjustment, Bolivia promoted and consolidated 10 
 
a free market economy. It followed rigorously the guidelines for achieving monetary and fiscal 
policy discipline and, at the same time, implemented various reforms oriented to the 
liberalization of the goods, services, and financial markets and to the privatization of the state 
owned enterprises (SOEs). 
As a result, Bolivia showed up as one of the more open economies in Latin America, 
according to the World Organization of Commerce and, it is stressed that this openness was first 
the result of anticipated reforms and independent initiatives of the Bolivian government and not 
necessarily the result of bilateral or multilateral treaties, as it occurred in other countries. 
The main elements of these reforms that affected directly the manufacturing sector 
include: 
• The application of uniform tariffs of 10 percent with very few exceptions, and insignificant 
non-tariff barriers. 
• Absence of controls to the access of the national markets, among them the use of quotas for 
imports and tariff levels. 
• Licenses for imports applicable to few products, and preference margins for government 
purchases in favor of national enterprises up to 10 percent.  
• Lack of antidumping measures as safeguard actions for industries. 
• Elimination of significant subsidies to the agriculture. 
• New national and sectorial legislation for investments. This legislation liberalized all the 
sectors, facilitating (or practically forcing) the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the sectors.  
• The legislation on FDI established the “national treatment” and other measures of protection 
and legal security for investors. 
• No discriminatory policies between sectors. All policies, to stimulate the manufacturing 
production, were the same for all sectors. 
• The reform of the tax system into a plain and efficient structure. Before 1985, there were 
around 120 taxes with excessive complexity. After 1987 the tax system included only 6 taxes 
with an understandable structure.
3   
As it can be seen, a series of national laws were enacted to create a robust protection for 
investors. The angular stone was certainly the Law of Investments of 1990, complemented with 
sectorial legislations like the new Code of Mining, the Law of Electricity, the Law of 
                                                 
3 See Otalora (2009) 11 
 
Telecommunications, and the Hydrocarbon Law, among others. These laws established the 
“national treatment”, that is to say that all company independent of its origin must receive the 
same treatment and ample guarantees for the exercise of its property rights.  
This law eliminated also all restrictions to the entrance and exit of capital and to the 
remission of dividends to other countries. Cheap credit (at low interest rates) and exemptions 
were removed; there were ample guarantees for the free convertibility of the currency, as well as 
for the free import and export of goods and services, and for the free determination of prices. All 
kind of production and commercialization activities (legally of course) were unrestrained and 
operations of risk sharing (joint ventures) were protected.  
 
III.1. Industrial Structure in Bolivia during 1988-2001 
To evaluate the impact of the market liberalization reforms on productivity, first we have to 
describe the manufacturing sector. During the period of 1988 - 2001 the manufacturing industry 
shows a stable behavior in relation to its participation in the productive structure of the country. 
The share of the manufacturing sector of GDP was 16.68 percent, on average, with a standard 
deviation of 0.0026 percentage points. Only in years 1995 and 1996, this share has been over 17 
percent, these years correspond to the period of 2
nd Generation Reforms. 






































































          Source: INE 
In table 2, we present some comparative economic indicators of the manufacturing 
industry. There is a sustainable fall in the household consumption of industrial products over 
total household consumption.  This consumption falls from 49.07 percent in 1988 to 45.69 
percent in 2001. We cannot affirm that the final demand of industrial products of national origin 
has been replaced by imports, because they do not show a sustainable increase throughout the 12 
 
period. In fact, imports show an irregular behavior, increasing between 1988 and 1992 and also 
between 1996 and 1998, but decreasing in other periods.
4 
Table 2: Comparative Economic Indicators of the Manufacturing Industry, 1988-2001 (in 
percentage) 
YEARS GDPi/GDPt IMPORi/IMPORt HOUS.CONi/HOUS.CONt FBKFi/FBKFt EXPi/EXPt 
1988  0.1628 0.8299  0.4907  0.3970  0.2259 
1989  0.1647 0.8391  0.4889  0.3545  0.2894 
1990  0.1696 0.8416  0.4871  0.4131  0.3348 
1991  0.1689 0.8487  0.4837  0.4801  0.3532 
1992  0.1663 0.8513  0.4802  0.4874  0.3658 
1993  0.1660 0.8250  0.4717  0.4721  0.3623 
1994  0.1672 0.8193  0.4752  0.4144  0.3931 
1995  0.1706 0.8250  0.4792  0.4509  0.3796 
1996  0.1714 0.8473  0.4772  0.4648  0.4137 
1997  0.1666 0.8568  0.4694  0.4797  0.4079 
1998  0.1626 0.8659  0.4612  0.3923  0.4653 
1999  0.1666 0.8247  0.4589  0.3818  0.5003 
2000  0.1654 0.8556  0.4597  0.3498  0.5129 
2001  0.1671 0.8342  0.4569  0.3332  0.5127 
Mean 0.1668  0.8403  0.4743  0.4194  0.3941 
Stand. 
Dev.  0.0026 0.0144  0.0116  0.0533  0.0839 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Observe also that the ratio Gross Formation of Fixed Capital (FBKF for its initials in 
Spanish) experienced an important growth during the years 1991 and 1992, falls towards 1994, 
recovers towards 1997, but then it falls even below the levels at the beginning of the period, 
which indicates that investment in the manufacturing industry decreased in the post-reform 
period, in particular in 2000 and 2001. In contrast, exports’ share displays a sustainable increase, 
from 22.59 percent to 51.27 percent. This is a direct result of the policy of the exports’ 
promotion that started in 1987 with the enactment of the D.S. 21660 and the Law 843 (Tax 
Reform). The aim of these measures was to introduce some mechanisms to guarantee the “tax 
neutrality” by allowing the return of indirect taxes paid by exporters of non-traditional goods, for 
instance. In 1990 the “Procedures for Temporary Admission for Exports (RITEX)” is also 
created. With this regime, exporters could import raw materials and intermediate goods with the 
goal to produce export goods, without having to pay taxes and tariffs.  
These and other measures to promote exports became consolidated with the enactment of 
the Law 1489 in 1993. With this law, exports and imports were fully liberalized, as well as 
access to international financing, and to any type of services that exporting firms considered 
                                                 
4 Cobas (1987) shows a clear negative relation between the ratios of household consumption and imports, during the 
period 1980-1986. 13 
 
necessary. Bolivia established also new bilateral and multilateral Commercial Agreements, 
seeking access to international markets with preferential conditions.
5       
 
III.2. Rates of Growth of the Economy and the Manufacturing Sector 
The three periods identified are clearly distinct in terms of growth in the economy. The 2
nd 
Generation Reform’s period (1994-1997) is clearly the one with the greatest rate of growth. The 
rate of accumulated annual growth was of 4.66 percent, as it is shown in table 3. Other variables 
as the household consumption, government consumption and the FBKF show the largest growth 
rates in this period. In fact the internal demand grew 6.35 percent. In contrast, exports display the 
lowest rate of growth (3.59 percent) and imports grew over 10 percent. 
Table 3: Rates of Accumulated Annual Growth (in percentages) 




Exports Imports  X-M 
      Hous.  Gov.  Total  FBKF  VE  Total             
2001/1988  0.0367   0.0319   0.0292   0.0315   0.0449   (0.0064)  0.0409   0.0328   0.0676   0.0469   (0.1396) 
1993/1988  0.0391   0.0307   0.0206   0.0293   0.0880   (1.6487)  0.0633   0.0340   0.0960   0.0632   (0.0820) 
1997/1994  0.0466   0.0387   0.0418   0.0392   0.1725   (2.1993)  0.2022   0.0635   0.0359   0.1011   (2.9719) 
2001/1998  0.0154   0.0211   0.0272   0.0219   (0.1536)  0.0211   (0.1468)  (0.0109)  0.0282   (0.0627)  (0.6087) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In the period of 2
nd Generation Reforms, the rate of growth of investment of 20.22 
percent is noteworthy, surpassing the moderate growth during the deepening of the 1
st 
Generation Reforms’ period (6.33 percent) and the growth in the whole period (4.09 percent). 
Although investment experienced this important rate of growth, in the Post-reforms’ period, it 
decreased by -14.68 percent. In general, all variables were depressed in their growth in the sub-
period of Post-reforms. The GDP hardly grew by 1.54 percent, the internal demand decreased by 
-1.09 percent and imports fell by -6.27 percent, while exports only grew by 2.82 percent. In 
synthesis we can say that this sub-period shows an economy entering a period of crisis that 
would reach its worst level in the year 2003.
6  
In the 1
st Generation Reforms’ period the rate of growth of exports (9.6 percent) is 
remarkable. Again this is the result of the market liberalization, free convertibility of the 
exchange rate, the elimination of all kind of price controls and the opening to the external 
commerce. However, we have to mention that Bolivian exports remain concentrated in few 
products related to natural resources or agricultural products, with emphasis on soy bean and its 
                                                 
5 See Candia (1999) 
6 Note that in the rest of the study we call the period of the deepening of the reforms as the 1
st Generation Reforms 
period only for simplicity.  14 
 
derivatives, zinc, silver, gold, tin, natural gas, woods and golden jewelry, which made exports 
still very vulnerable to fluctuations of international prices of commodities.  
The government consumption had its greater growth during the 2
nd Generation Reforms’ 
period also as a result mainly of the implementation of the Pensions’ System Reform. Bolivia 
passed from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system. It influenced also the process of 
Administrative Decentralization that implied a decentralization of the government expenditure 
programs towards the regions, in particular municipalities (Law of Popular Participation and the 
Law of Decentralization). 
In general, throughout the period of analysis, the economy had a moderate growth of 3.67 
percent. It could even be considered low, if we think that a poor country like Bolivia needs rates 
of growth larger than 6 percent to reduce poverty. Only exports surpassed this rate of 6 percent. 
Apparently, the market liberalization period had been successful only in this issue and for few 
selected companies.  
The unfolding of the Manufacturing Industry during the three stages of reference is very 
similar to what occurred in the economy as a whole. In the following table it can be seen that the 
rates of accumulated annual growth of the industrial GDP were slightly superior to those of the 
economy but they can also be considered low. In the whole period the industrial GDP grew only 
by 3.88 percent. 
Table 4: Rates of Accumulated Annual Growth in the Manufacturing Industry (in 
percentages) 












2001/1988  0.0388   0.0262  0  0.0262  0.0309   (2.1441)  0.0493   0.0290   0.1371   0.0473   (0.0070) 
1993/1988  0.0432    0.0226 0 0.0226  0.1264    0.2533    0.1178   0.0345   0.2045   0.0620   0.0081  
1997/1994  0.0454   0.0345  0  0.0345  0.2311   (2.2926)  0.3391   0.0816   0.0487   0.1176   0.1770  
2001/1998  0.0247    0.0179  0  0.0179 (0.1985) (0.0731) (0.1825) (0.0219)  0.0620   (0.0742) (0.1936) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note that in the whole period the government did not acquire consumer goods from the 
manufacturing industry. In fact one of the basic supports of the NPE was an austere fiscal policy. 
This adjustment based in the rationalization of the government expenditures eliminated all type 
of acquisitions from the industrial sector. This practice which was common during the import 
substitution period and the State’s capitalism, introduced several distortions because most of 
these acquisitions were made from selected firms and with subsidized prices.  15 
 
The sub-period of 2
nd Generation Reforms is characterized by an increase in household 
consumption of 3.45 percent, as well as of imports of 11.76 percent. In this period the investment 
in the manufacturing sector experienced also an important rate of growth of 33.91 percent which 
lead to a rate of growth of the internal demand of 8.16 percent. In contrast, the sub-period of 
Post-reforms, already classified as the beginning of the crisis, shows a depressing manufacturing 
sector. Investment fell by -18.25 percent, which implies a decrease of the internal demand of -
2.19 percent, even though household consumption increased slightly by 1.79 percent.  
During the sub-period of 1
st Generation Reforms we have to emphasize the high rate of 
growth of exports (20.45 percent). This rate is indeed also explained by the application of all the 
market liberalization reforms mentioned above. The FBKF experienced also an interesting 
growth of 12.64 percent. During the 2
nd Generation Reforms, it grew at a 23.11 percent but in the 
Post Reforms period it decreased at a rate of -19.85 percent. Everything indicates that all the 
efforts made with the 1
st and 2
nd Generation Reforms did not have a solid base, since the main 
variables show an important decline at the end of the period of analysis. 
 
III.3. Employment in the Manufacturing Industry  
The manufacturing industry occupied the second place in terms of employment share in the 
urban areas of Bolivia, as it is seen in table 5. On average, during the period 1988-2001, it 
absorbed 17 percent of the employment, after the commerce sector that occupied 25 percent of 
the population. In third place appears the communal and personal services with 11.92 percent 
and the rest of the sectors, each occupy less than 10 percent of the population. This tendency has 
maintained also in the last years, so it can be considered the standard pattern of the Bolivian 
economy. 
The years in which the manufacturing sector contributed with more employment were 
1997 with 19.81 percent, 1992 with 19.59 percent and 1996 with 19.14 percent. In the 1
st 
Generation Reforms’ period there is a sustainable growth in employment, whereas the opposite 
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Table 5: Employment Share by Sectors, 1988-2001 (in percentages) 
Economic 
Activity 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 




1.89 2.22 1.23 1.77 2.09 1.87 1.63 2.20 2.76 1.89 3.84 4.90  11.37 
Mining 
Extraction  
1.86 1.99 1.99 2.07 1.79 1.36 1.26 1.66 1.15 1.27 0.85 1.70 1.13 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
12.91 14.08 15.92 18.08 19.59 18.30 18.18 18.21 19.14 19.81 18.37 15.30 14.15 
Production, 
Distribution of 
Gas and Water 
0.47 0.83 0.61 0.75 0.75 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.53 0.63 0.27 0.80 0.52 




24.30 22.50 22.32 24.90 25.23 25.73 27.23 27.69 26.84 24.37 26.89 25.40 24.31 
Hotels and  
Restaurants 




7.59 7.83 7.68 7.22 7.13 8.40 7.49 7.56 6.97 8.65 8.58 6.90 7.69 
Financial 
Intermediation 





1.72 1.45 1.85 2.76 3.12 3.16 2.93 2.83 3.05 3.65 3.56 4.60 4.72 
Public 
Administration 








10.60 11.07 10.57 10.64  9.49  10.43  9.95  9.36  8.76  10.64 10.52  8.70  8.27 
Extra territorial 
Organizations 
0.46 0.74 0.86 0.27 0.72 0.14 0.23 0.33 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.03 
Note: Year 1998 is not included because that year the INE did not implement any statistical activity for employment. 
Source: INE, based on Household and Employment Surveys. 
 
IV. Data 
We employ data drawn from the Bolivian Annual Manufacturing Survey 1988-2001 (BAMS). 
The BAMS is an unbalanced panel of Bolivian formal firms. This survey was implemented every 
year and approximately 8 months after the bookkeeping period is finished. The information 
corresponds to the bookkeeping year of the firms (12 months) which starts on April 1
st until 
March 30
th, or January 1
st until December 31
st, thus the survey is based on the Bookkeeping 
Registries and Balance Sheets of the firms. 17 
 
The institution in charge of its implementation is the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
The survey started being implemented in the 70s as a survey to all kind of economic 
establishments (commerce, logistics facilities, construction, mining and manufacturing industry). 
However, from 1988 to 2001 the survey covered only the manufacturing industry
7.  
The survey has a national coverage, it includes industrial establishments from the 9 
Departments of Bolivia.
8 All large and medium firms from the sample universe are included. 
Large firms are categorized as the ones that have 50 and more employees, medium firms have 
between 15 to 49 employees. Small firms are a sample of small formal firms in the country. They 
are categorized as having between 5 to 14 employees. Micro firms are also included in the 
sample. This is because small firms that were included, later shrank to less than five workers.   
The survey contains variables related to the value of production, sales, consumption of 
raw materials, electrical energy and fuels consumption, personnel occupied, payments and 
wages, taxes and fixed assets. Firms are classified by sectors according to four digits 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). In addition, as all establishments with 
more than 15 employees were included in the survey and firms with less than 15 employees were 
subject to random sampling, the survey is not based on a Census of firms. Establishments were 
added into the database just to have a representative picture of the sectorial structure of the 
manufacturing industry. Certainly, this issue does not exclude the possibility that some sectors 
can be under or over represented.
9 
To validate our data, in table 6 we present the number of firms and employment by size 
class in 1992. This data corresponds to the 2
nd Census of Economic Establishments performed in 
Bolivia. Notice that micro and small firms (less than 15 workers) represent 90 percent of total 
firms and constitute 50 percent of total employment in the Manufacturing sector. Although large 
firms (more than 50 workers) constitute only 2 percent of total firms, they account for 
approximately 33 percent of employment.  
 
 
                                                 
7 The INE stopped its implementation in 2001, but it implemented again in 2008. In this new version (not available 
yet) they included questions related to environment and the usage of information and communication technologies 
(ICT). 
8 Although it has a national coverage, it includes only 1 firm from the Department of Pando and few from the 
Department of Beni. 
9 The survey was stopped, because of lack of funds to continue implementing it. It seems that in 2000 and 2001 this 
problem lead to a reduction in the number of firms surveyed. 18 
 
Table 6: Number of Firms and Employment by Size Class (1992) 






















1-4 10783  10783  75  75  22970  22970  30  30 
5-9 1674  12457  12  87 10454  33424  14  44 
10-14 388 12845  3  89  4564 37988  6  50 
15-19 189 13034  1  91  3112 41100  4  54 
20-24 132 13166  1  92  2887 43987  4  57 
25-29 77 13243  1  92  2072  46059  3  60 
30-39 94 13337  1  93  3147  49206  4  64 
40-49 52 13389  0  93  2301  51507  3  67 
50-99 111 13500  1  94  7556 59063  10  77 
100 or 
more  81 13581  1  94 17655  76718  23  100 
Missing 808  14389  6  100         
Source: INE-2
nd Census of Economic Establishments 
According to the data, it seems that the INE divided the whole period in two sub-periods. 
One sub-period goes from 1988 to 1994 and the other goes from 1995 to 2001. We noticed that 
division because first, firms in the data from 1988 to 1994 were classified according to ISIC 
revision 2 and firms in the data from 1995 to 2001 were classified according to ISIC revision 3. 
Second, although some firms appear in both sub-periods they were given different identification 
numbers. To merge the two data sets we had to identify firms by their names, commercial labels, 
address and even their numbers of Unique Registry of Contributors. In some cases we have also 
reassigned the ISIC numbers because they were not standardized. 
 
IV.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In the data base, we deleted all the firms that report negative and zero value added and also those 
firms that reported no employees and no fixed assets in some year. After deleting those firms we 
arrived to an average number of 770 firms per year. Table 7 summarizes the number of firms in 
each year. 
  In terms of employment, our data accounts for 35000 employees per year, on average. 
The maximum number of workers is reached in year 1998 with 43951 employees, while the 
minimum number of workers corresponds to year 1988 with 28347 employees. The following 





Table 7: Number of Firms in the Panel by Size 
   Number of Workers 
Year 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-249  250  or 
more 
TOTAL 
1988  140 207  187  178  72  50  15  849 
1989  169 197  170  171  83  49  18  857 
1990  247 215  188  164  86  50  17  967 
1991  105 111  138  157  81  59  18  669 
1992  187 167  177  161  90  62  24  868 
1993  107 199  157  165  94  52  32  806 
1994  111 202  155  159  87  61  37  812 
1995  86 185 168  134  71  56  27  727 
1996  28 159 150  134  75  68  33  647 
1997  68 202 168  130  77  68  30  743 
1998  89 239 192  151  80  81  39  871 
1999  134 204  190  132  83  64  42  849 
2000  81 106  96  94  56  58  30  521 
2001  98 120 106  121  59  65  26  595 
Source: Author’s calculations 
     
Table 8: Employment and Value-Added covered by the Data (Average 1988-2001) 























1-4 346  346  1  1  7.62  7.62  0 0 
5-9 1200  1547  3  4  23.22  30.84  1  1 
10-19 2217  3764  6  11 61.00  91.84 2  3 
20-49 4608  8372 13  24  230.13  321.97 7  10 
50-99 5367  13738  15  39  236.93  558.91 7  18 
100 or more  20913  34651  59  97  2573.26  3132.16  81  99 
Source: INE 
According to the 1992 Census, firms with more than 10 employees account for 56 percent 
of total employment in the manufacturing sector. In our data, these firms represent 95 percent of 
total employment and account for approximately 99 percent of total value added (output) in the 
industry. These percentages indicate that our data is not a good representation of small firms. 
Nevertheless, the fact that 99 percent of total value added is covered by firms with more than 10 
employees, allows us to remove those firms with less than 10 workers for our baseline 
calculations.
10 
                                                 
10 Results do not change when we add the smaller firms. 20 
 
 
V. Productivity Dynamics in Bolivia 
To document resource misallocation and productivity in Bolivia’s manufacturing industry, we 
employ the model developed by Hsieh and Klenow (2008) (hereafter HK08). It is a standard 
model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms that shows how distortions that 
drive wedges between the marginal products of capital and labor across firms lower aggregate 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP). All the details of the model’s derivation can be found in 
appendix 1. 
In the last years, TFP has been analyzed by the macro literature emphasizing the analysis 
of gaps and recently this analysis has turned to the microstructure of productivity and its 
implications for aggregate TFP. Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2008) state that aggregate TFP is 
affected both by the underlying distribution of establishments’ productivities and the allocation 
of resources –e.g. capital and labor- across these units. In this behalf, in this section we compute 
the size and distribution of wedges that explain aggregate TFP in Bolivia, using the BAMS 
survey.
11  
For our calculations we computed the Gross Production Value and Intermediate 
Consumption to obtain the Value-Added, which is our measure of output. We have information 
on the number of workers as well as on their remunerations. Therefore, we have used wage 
payments, bonus payments and benefits for our measure of labor compensation. Finally, we 
employed the value of fixed assets as our capital measure. All of the variables are firm-level 
variables and the industries are classified according to 4 digit ISIC (ISIC-4) classification.  
For our baseline calculations that excludes firms with less than 10 employees, we 
employed the same values used by HK08 for the rental price of capital R and the elasticity of 
substitution between firm value added σ, i.e, R=0.10 and σ=3. In appendix 3, we perform a 
sensitivity analysis using a value of σ=5, to verify if efficiency gains in Bolivia are sensitive to 
the curvature parameter as Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2008) demonstrate.  
We also set the elasticity of output with respect to capital in each industry (αs) to be one 
minus the labor share in the corresponding industry in the U.S. To construct the shares we used 
the NBER data and defined labor share as labor compensation over value-added. We took the 
                                                 
11 For the analysis of gaps see Klenow and Rodriguez-Claré (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) and Hsieh (2002). For the 
microstructure see Bartelsman and Dom (2001) and Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) and (2002). 21 
 
average over all the years of the data after matching the U.S. codes to the relevant codes for 
Bolivia. Also as a robustness check we performed our calculations using the labor shares from 
Bolivia and industry shares from US.
12  
Then, based on these parameter values and the firm data, we infer the wedges and firm 







































   (3) 
Equations (1) and (2) enable us to infer the presence of capital and output distortions 
respectively. In equation (3) we compute TFPQ (our measure of physical productivity) and we 
have to mention two things about the scalar κs. First, the scalar  s s s s P Y P w
s / ) ( 1
1
1 − − = σ α κ  is not 
observable, because we do not have industry prices for all the sectors. However, even though we 
do not observe κs, relative productivities – and hence reallocation gains – are unaffected by 
setting κs =1 for each industry s.  Second, κs varies not only across industries, but also across 
time. Following Tybout (2008) it would have been ideal to adjust TFPQ by this scalar to account 
for cyclical fluctuations, but as we mentioned, we do not have prices for all the sectors. Thus, we 
have just used the overall industry price index to adjust our measure of TFP in order to make 
comparisons between years.  
Before calculating the gains from our hypothetical liberalization, as HK08, we omitted 
the 1 percent tails of  ) / log( s si A adj A × , where 
) 1 /( 1 ) / 1 (
− =
σ
s M adj , and 
) / log( s si TFPR TFPR across industries. That is, we pooled all industries and omitted the top and 
the bottom 1 percent of firms within each of the pools in order to eliminate outliers. We then 
recalculated wLs, Ks and PsYs as well as s TFPR and s A . We also calculated the Bolivian industry 
shares θs = PsYs /PY. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See the results in appendix 3. 22 
 
V.1. Aggregate TFP and Reallocation Gains  
Through frontier estimations of production functions, Jimenez and Landa (2004) conclude that 
there is a clear lack of technical efficiency among firms in Bolivia. In other words, firms obtain 
levels of output under their possibilities of production. We show that this inefficiency can be 
attributed to a decline in productivity among firms. The next table presents the evolution of 
aggregate TFP in the Bolivian manufacturing sector for the period 1988-2001. It displays the 
evolution of actual TFP and also the evolution of potential TFP which is the TFP that would 
have arisen in the absence of distortions.
13   
Table 9:  Evolution of Aggregate TFP (in percentages) 
Period TFP  TFP
eff 
88-01  -9.3 -15.8 
88-93  -2.7 -12.7 
94-97  -30.8 -36.2 
98-01  -38.5 -41.6 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: TFP
eff refers to potential TFP 
It can be seen first, that variations of potential TFP are higher than variations of actual 
TFP, while actual TFP decreases by -9.3 percent in the whole period, potential TFP decreases by 
-15.8 percent. Second, actual TFP decreases at an increasing rate in each of our selected sub-
periods. In the 1
st Generations Reform period TFP decreases only by -2.7 percent. In the 2
nd 
Generations Reform period, it decreases by -30.8 percent and in the Post-reforms period, it 
decreases by -38.5 percent. In general, the persistent decline in TFP shows that the intention to 
promote productivity with the market liberalization reforms remained as an intention. Actual and 
potential TFP decreased not only in the Post Reforms period where we have seen that investment 
decreased a lot, but also in the 1
st and 2
nd Generation Reforms periods where investments in the 
manufacturing industry increased and exports boosted.  
In the model of appendix 3 we show that TFPR (our measure of revenue productivity) is 
related to the ratio of distortions. Therefore, as in HK08 we perform the same “liberalization” 
exercise by computing the TFP gains from reallocation, i.e. the gains of removing the efficiency 
loss introduced by the output and capital distortions or in other words by fully equalizing TFPR 
                                                 
13 TFP for each sector is computed as in equation (A.22) of the model in appendix 1 and aggregated using our Cobb 
Douglas aggregator in equation (A.1).  TFP
* is equation (A.22) but with the ratio  si s TFPR TFPR /  equal to 1. 23 
 
across firms in each industry. The ratio of actual TFP to the efficient TFP is computed according 














































Table 10: TFP Gains from Equalizing TFPR within Industries (in percentages) 
ISIC-4 (TFPeff/TFP)-1 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993  1994 
TFP gains  52.5 55.8 56.7 55.4 59.7  57  62.3 
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 
TFP gains  53.5 60.8 65.5 70.6 59.2 59.8  60.6 
   Source: Author’s calculations 
The elimination of distortions (τk and τy) would boost aggregate manufacturing TFP by 
around 59.3 percent, on average, in the whole period. In the stabilization and the 2
nd Generation 
Reforms periods the elimination of distortions would raise TFP by 56.2 percent and 60.6 percent 
respectively, while in the post reforms period it would raise TFP by 62.6 percent. The year in 
which full liberalization would have the major impact would be 1998 with an increase in TFP by 
70.6 percent while in 1988 would be the year with the least impact, of only 52.5 percent. 
Allocation gains are low compared to the gains found for India and China, by HK08, 
which are about 100 percent, but the Bolivian gains are higher than the gains found for the US 
which are between 31-43 percent. Notice also that the gains increase as time passes which means 
that allocative efficiency declined during the 2
nd Generations Reform period and obviously 
during the Post Reforms period.  
Bolivia is situated, in terms of allocative inefficiency, between the US and India-China. 
Table 11 below shows the efficiency loss introduced by the output and capital wedges in 
comparison to US in 1997 as reported in HK08. It is seen that on average the TFP gains relative 
to the U.S, are in the order of 11.5 percent. For Bolivia, hypothetically moving to “U.S. 
efficiency” in 1997 might have boosted TFP by 9.3 percent and 12.4 percent in the 1
st and 2
nd 
Generation Reforms periods respectively.  
Table 11: TFP Gains of Equalizing TFPR relative to U.S. in 1997 (in percentages) 
ISIC-4 (TFPeff/TFP)-1 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993  1994 
TFP gains  6.7 9 9.7  8.7  11.7  9.9 13.6 
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 
TFP gains  7.4  12.6 15.8 19.4 11.4 11.7  12.4 
  Source: Author’s calculations 24 
 
The initial conclusion of this section is that Bolivian allocative efficiency declined by 
about -5 percent from 1988 to 2001 or -0.4 percent per year. This implied decline in allocative 
efficiency is surprising given that many reforms took place in this period. Considering that TFP 
growth decreased by -9.3 percent between 1988 and 2001, the implied decline in allocative 
efficiency explains around 4 percent of TFP negative growth or in other words 4 percent of TFP 
decline could be attributed to a worst allocation of capital and labor across firms.  
Figure 2 plots the “efficient” vs. actual size distribution of plants in each year. Size is 
measured as firm value added. Notice that in all the years the hypothetical efficient distribution is 
more dispersed than the actual one. This means that in the Bolivian manufacturing industry, there 
should be fewer mid-sized firms and more small and large firms or small and large firms should 
produce more than what they are actually producing.   
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  Source: Author’s calculations 
In table 12 we display how the size of initially big vs. small firms would change if TFPR 
were equalized in Bolivia and the U.S. in year 1997. The rows are initial (actual) plant size 
quartiles, and the columns are bins of efficient plant size relative to actual size: 0-50% (the plant 
should shrink by a half or more), 50-100%, 100-200%, and 200+% (the plant should at least 
double in size).   25 
 
Table 12: Percentage of Firms, Actual Size vs. Efficient Size in Bolivia and U.S. (1997) 
Size measured as Value Added 
1997 0-50%  50-100%  100-200%  200+% 
Bolivia 
Top Size Quartile  3.9  6.5 7.4 7.2 
2nd Quartile  4.1  6.3 9.8 4.8 
3rd Quartile  2.8 8.3 10.4 3.5 
Bottom Quartile  2.1 5.7 13.3 3.7 
U.S. 
Top Size Quartile  4.4 10.0  6.7  3.9 
2nd Quartile  4.4  9.6 5.8 5.1 
3rd Quartile  4.5  9.8 5.4 5.4 
Bottom Quartile  4.7 12.0  4.3  4.1 
  Source:  Author’s  calculations 
In Bolivia there is a clear dominance of the third column while in the US the dominance 
appears in the second column. These results indicate that the majority of the Bolivian firms in 
each quartile should double their size. In contrast, the US firms in each quartile should decrease 
by less than a half. 
We also performed the same exercise as in table 12, but now defining size as the number 
of workers in each firm. In the table below it is seen again that in all of the firms considered, they 
nned to increase the number of workers, in fact they should double the number of workers, in 
order to improve efficiency.
14  
Table 13: Percentage of Firms’ Actual Size vs. Efficient Size in Bolivia (1995) 
Size measured as Number of Employees 
1995 0-50%  50-100%  100-200%  200+% 
Number of workers             
10-19  4.48 8.30  15.02  8.97 
20-49  5.16 6.95  10.54  6.73 
50-99  1.35 4.48 7.17 2.24 
100-249  1.79 2.24 7.62 0.90 
250+  0.45 1.12 4.26 0.22 
      Source: Author’s calculations 
One of the weakest issues of the reforms performed in Bolivia and with an important 
impact over the manufacturing industry is certainly the labor legislation. Jemio (2000) states, that 
the labor legislation, the regulations and the government intervention have created rigidities and 
distortions in the labor market and in the business practices. The General Law of Labor in 
Bolivia that is still in effect today, was approved in 1939 and upgraded to a rank of law in 1942. 
                                                 
14 Tables 12 and 13 for each year are available upon request from the authors. In general the results are very similar 
in each year. 26 
 
The first regulations were enacted in 1943 and since then there have been lots of modifications, 
exceptions and amplifications to the law with the sole consequence of complicating the 
interpretation and application of the law.  
First, the law promotes uncertainty, for instance in 1982 there were 500 laws and 2500 
regulations affecting directly or indirectly the law. Second, the labor legislation and the social 
legislation have significantly increased the labor costs. Labor costs are affected by the minimum 
wage, government pressures over the private sector, taxes, bonus payments, overtime, payment 
for night work and for holydays, sick leave, compensations, among other payments. The reaction 
of the employers to these regulations has been, first to evade most of these payments (informality 
or pseudo informality) and second, to employ less workers than what they actually needed. 
 
V.2. Physical and Revenue Productivity in Bolivia  
To understand TFP levels and growth during the market liberalization period in Bolivia, it is 
important to analyze the distribution of our physical productivity measure (TFPQ) and revenue 
productivity measure (TFPR) as well as the distribution of the output and capital distortions.
15    
Remember that it is not only the level, but also the dispersion of TFPQ and TFPR that 
will affect aggregate productivity in the economy. In figures 3 and 4, we plot the distribution of 
TFPQ and TFPR for all firms in the sample for each year as a log-deviation from industry 
specific means. Notice that TFPQ is more dispersed and shifted to the right, while TFPR is less 
dispersed and displays a more regular figure, similar to a normal distribution, with a mean 














                                                 
15 In equations (A.20) and (A.23) of appendix 1, TFPR is defined for firms and sectors.  27 
 





































































































































































































































































  Source: Author’s calculations 

































































































































































































































































  Source: Author’s calculations 28 
 
In table 14 we show several measures of dispersion for TFPQ and TFPR: the standard 
deviation, the 75
th minus the 25
th percentiles, the 90
th minus the 10
th percentiles and the 50
th 
minus the 10
th percentiles.   
Table 14: Dispersion of TFPQ and TFPR 
TFPQ 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sd  1.25 1.15 1.27 1.26 1.28 1.25 1.26 1.21 1.19 1.13 1.12 1.29 1.25 1.20 
p75_p25  1.57 1.54 1.72 1.69 1.76 1.65 1.69 1.50 1.43 1.50 1.50 1.62 1.54 1.71 
p90_p10  3.26 2.90 3.31 3.14 3.30 3.16 3.37 2.91 2.82 2.77 2.74 2.92 3.31 2.94 
p50_p10  2.04 1.73 2.07 1.92 2.01 1.78 2.09 1.80 1.74 1.58 1.55 1.73 2.10 1.85 
TFPR 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sd  0.91 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.86 0.88 
p75_p25  1.06 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.13 1.03 1.06 0.83 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.97 
p90_p10  2.16 2.09 2.23 2.15 2.38 2.09 2.07 1.98 1.99 1.86 2.07 2.08 1.96 2.06 
p50_p10  1.27 1.19 1.43 1.18 1.38 1.21 1.18 1.24 1.18 1.03 1.24 1.18 1.25 1.26 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Standard deviation for TFPQ is on average 1.22 which is larger than what HK08 found 
for China and the U.S. in any of the years, but is similar to the standard deviation found for India 
in the year 1994. The difference of the 90
th percentile and the 10
th percentile is, as in India, above 
3 in most of the years. The largest difference occurs in 1994 with a value of 3.37, while the 
lowest difference occurs in 1998 with a value of 2.74.  
Dispersion of TFPR has been on average 0.86. In the year 1994 it was higher than in 
India (0.67), and in 1997 it was higher also than in the U.S (0.49). The difference of the 75
th 
percentile minus the 25
th percentile ranges from 0.83 to 1.13. This range is above the ranges 
found for India (0.79-0.81) and the US (0.46-0.53) by HK08. Only China displays similar 
differences, in fact it ranges from 0.82 to 0.97. The numbers in the table are consistent with 
greater distortions in Bolivia than in India and the U.S. but with similar distortions as China. 
In table 15 we show the same dispersion measures as in table 14, but for the wedges. In 
any year the standard deviation of τK is higher than the standard deviation of τY. The standard 
deviation of τK decreases from 1.07 in 1988 to 0.94 in 1993 which corresponds exactly to our 1
st 
Generation Reforms period. It increases in 1997 up to 0.97 and in 1998 and 2001 it reports a 
standard deviation of 1. The standard deviation of the output distortion τK shows a more irregular 
pattern although it decreases if we compare the beginning and the end of the period. It decreases 
from 0.76 to 0.62. 
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Table 15: Dispersion of the Wedges τK and τY 
τK 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sd  1.07 1.05 0.99 0.88 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.97 1.00 0.93 0.86 1.00 
p75_p25  1.27 1.13 1.11 1.07 1.17 1.06 1.24 1.16 1.19 1.03 1.14 0.97 0.94 1.02 
p90_p10  2.65 2.51 2.46 2.14 2.39 2.30 2.40 2.35 2.29 2.43 2.29 2.38 2.19 2.22 
p50_p10  1.14 1.03 1.10 0.99 1.05 1.00 1.10 1.07 1.09 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.88 0.77 
τY 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sd  0.76 0.60 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.77 0.66 0.67 0.58 0.64 0.69 0.67 0.62 
p75_p25  0.85 0.74 0.83 0.78 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.64 0.66 0.61 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.67 
p90_p10  1.70 1.46 1.80 1.79 1.83 1.75 1.84 1.55 1.53 1.38 1.46 1.56 1.70 1.53 
p50_p10  0.77 0.69 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.66 0.72 0.61 0.74 0.67 0.79 0.61 
 Source: Author’s calculations 
The patterns described by the statistics in tables 14 and 15 are complemented by scatter 
plots of the log of TFPQ relative to the industry mean and the log of TFPR, the output distortion 
and the capital distortion also relative to their industry means. The plots are in appendix 2 and 
show a negative correlation between TFPQ and the output distortion. There is a positive 
correlation between TFPQ and the capital distortion and also there is a positive and strong 
correlation between TFPQ and TFPR.  
Table 16: Regressing log (TFPR) on log (TFPQ) 
Year  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
logAsi  0.5885*** 0.5877*** 0.5492*** 0.5716*** 0.5892*** 0.5491*** 0.5701*** 
   [0.0264] [0.0289] [0.0522] [0.0136] [0.0195] [0.0422] [0.0213] 
Constant  0.5585*** 0.5904*** 0.5244*** 0.5265*** 0.5617*** 0.5302*** 0.5463*** 
   [0.0329] [0.0345] [0.0525] [0.0271] [0.0230] [0.0425] [0.0220] 
Observations  489 479 489 441 497 484 482 
R-squared  0.701 0.663 0.703 0.752 0.723 0.702 0.715 
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
logAsi  0.5480*** 0.5582*** 0.5347*** 0.5414*** 0.5377*** 0.5707*** 0.5475*** 
   [0.0325] [0.0474] [0.0416] [0.0272] [0.0227] [0.0595] [0.0424] 
Constant  0.5234*** 0.5216*** 0.5501*** 0.5676*** 0.5390*** 0.5183*** 0.5726*** 
   [0.0281] [0.0311] [0.0350] [0.0297] [0.0341] [0.0382] [0.0453] 
Observations  446 447 460 528 484 325 357 
R-squared  0.669 0.680 0.620 0.609 0.676 0.674 0.607 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: *** if significative at 1%; ** if significative at 5%; * if significative at 10% 
HK08 state that efficiency is linked to not only dispersion in TFPR but also its covariance 
with TFPQ. Hitting higher TFPQ firms with bigger distortions (higher TFPR) is particularly 
damaging to aggregate TFP.  Table 16 presents the regressions of log(TFPR) on log(TFPQ). 
Notice that the elasticities are positive and significative at 1 percent level in all the years. 30 
 
Moreover, the coefficients are always above 0.5 which means that in all of the years they are 
larger in Bolivia than in India, China or the U.S. This result suggests efficient firms may face 
more restrictions in Bolivia than in other of the three countries.  
 
V.3. Bolivian Features and TFP 
In this section we test some common beliefs related to productivity for the Bolivian case by 
performing some basic regressions using TFPQ and TFPR as our dependent variables. 
Specifically we analyze the relation between TPFQ and TFPR with exporting firms, size (where 
size is measured as the number of employees) age and geographical location. As our sample is 
small, in this section we present the results using the whole sample, i.e. including firms with less 
than 10 employees. This fact guarantees also the significance of the coefficients in the 
regressions; otherwise results would have to be taken with caution as we were including a few 
observations.  
First, we analyze TFPQ and TFPR in exporting and non-exporting firms. In Table 17 we 
show the results of regressing the log of TFPQ and TFPR (relative to industry means) on a 
dummy that represents exporting firms. Regressions are weighted least squares with industry 
value added shares as weights for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 as representative years for our 
three reform periods. 
Table 17: Productivity for Exporters (vs. Non-exporters) 
TFPQ 
Years 1990 1995 2000 
Export 0.1578*  0.1153***  0.0042 
   [0.0884]  [0.0391]  [0.0415] 
TFPR 
Export  -0.0638 0.0620** -0.0520 
   [0.0680]  [0.0257]  [0.0446] 
         Source: Author’s calculations 
             Note: *** if significative at 1%; ** if significative at 5%; * if significative at 10% 
Notice, that exporting firms had 16 percent higher TFPQ in 1990 than non-exporting 
firms. This advantage decreased in 1995 to 11 percent and less than 1 percent in 2000. The fact 
that the coefficient in year 2000 in not statistically significant implies also that this 0.4 percent 
higher TFPQ is not meaningful and exporters and non-exporters have the same productivity. In 
comparison with the US, TFPQ differences are much lower in Bolivia, in US TFPQ is 121 
percent higher on average for exporting firms. The main difference is that in USA exports are 31 
 
concentrated in many firms while in Bolivia exports are concentrated in only a few firms. In the 
year 2000, almost three-fourths of total exported products came out from hardly 10 companies 
and more than 83 percent came out from only 20 companies. In Bolivia, it is typical to observe, 
even today, a shift towards a greater concentration of the exported value in few companies. 
If we consider TFPR, the results indicate that although exporting firms reported lower 
TFPR in 1990 and 2000, these differences are not statistically significant. In 1995, exporting 
firms display a 6.2 percent higher TFPR and this difference is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. Recall from equation (A.21) in the model, that TFPR is related to the ratio of 
distortions (1+τK)
α/(1-τY) so we can interpret TFPR as the level of distortions. In this behalf we 
can see that in year 1995 exporting firms suffered a higher level of distortions, which can be 
related to the higher level of formality under which they usually operate.  
In sum exporting firms are more productive than non-exporting firms, but this advantage 
decreased during the reforms period, in opposition to what was expected. Bernard and Jensen 
(2001) document, based in previous works, that exporters have higher productivity along with 
more workers, higher wages, greater capital intensity, higher technology intensity, and are more 
likely to be part of a multi-plant firm. The results confirm that during the 1
st and 2
nd Generation 
Reforms periods, exporters had higher productivity, but faced the same distortions as non-
exporters. The fact that exporting firms are very few in each of the years explains the declining 
pattern of aggregate TFP. Although exporting firms are more productive and as we have seen in 
section III, their exports grew in each of the periods, they cannot compensate for the decline in 
aggregate TFP. In 1988, exporting firms represented only 12 percent, while in 1995 they 
represented 20 percent of total firms.  
The commercial liberalization that took place promoted an effective openness and 
integration of Bolivia with the external commerce, but it did not increase the competitiveness 
and productivity of the tradable sector in a sustainable manner.  
Next, we analyze if there are differences in TFPQ and TFPR among large, medium, small 
and micro firms in Bolivia. Recall that this size division considers the number of employees per 
firm. Table 18 shows the results of the corresponding regressions for the years 1990, 1995 and 
2000. 
As in the previous regressions, the dependent variable is the deviation of log TFPQ and 
TFPR from the industry mean. The independent variables are dummies for medium, small and 32 
 
micro firms. The omitted coefficient is for micro firms. As expected, productivity is positively 
correlated with size. Large firms tend to be more productive than medium sized firms and 
medium sized firms tend to be marginally more productive than small firms. Only in the year 
1995, there are no differences in TFPQ among small and micro firms. In sum, large firms are the 
most productive of all and differences in productivity are sizable and became larger. In 1990, 
large firms had a 178 percent higher TFPQ than micro firms, while in 2000 large firms had a 216 
percent higher TFPQ. 
Table 18: Productivity by Size 
TFPQ 
Year  1990 1995 2000 
Small 0.6071***  0.2475  0.5775** 
    [0.1822] [0.2932] [0.2449] 
Medium  1.0782*** 0.8403*** 1.3212*** 
    [0.1766] [0.2565] [0.2930] 
Large  1.7887*** 1.6368*** 2.1632*** 
    [0.2249] [0.3430] [0.2746] 
TFPR 
Small  0.0839 -0.1674 0.0531 
    [0.1137] [0.1871] [0.1798] 
Medium  -0.1742 -0.3049** -0.2081 
    [0.1353] [0.1496] [0.2041] 
Large  -0.0920 -0.2089 -0.0289 
    [0.1800] [0.1997] [0.1789] 
      Source: Author’s calculations 
          Note: *** if significative at 1%; ** if significative at 5%; * if significative at 10% 
An interesting result comes out from analyzing TFPR differences. Differences between 
large, medium and micro firms are statistically not significant, with the exception of medium 
firms in the year 1995. In this year, medium firms have 30 percent lower TFPR than micro firms, 
which means that they faced smaller distortions. The results point out that all type of firms face 
the same level of distortions. How can be that small firms face the same distortions as large 
firms? Following Lazear (2000), we think that labor flexibility among all kind of firms can be 
part of the explanation. This fact allows small firms to be hit from fewer distortions. Further 
more, the higher level of informality among small firms and pseudo informality among medium 
and even large firms explain the equal level of distortions under which firms operate in Bolivia.
16  
                                                 
16 See Birbuet and Machicado (2009) for an interesting case study among formal and informal firms in the shoe-
leather sector.  33 
 
We conclude that there is a direct relation between TFPQ and size. TFPQ decreases with 
the size of the firm, large firms are the most productive, while micro firms are the least 
productive. But TFPR did not have a direct relation with size.  
Next, in table 19, we analyze the relation between productivity and age of the firms. 
Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2008) consider that firm’s age might be an important covariate to 
consider when analyzing TFPR. One of the reasons for this is, for instance, that borrowing 
constraints are less likely to affect older firms, because as time goes by firms might be able to 
extent their reach and access more markets and/or government purchases and tap into resources 
of better neighbors. We have classified younger firms as those firms that are less than 5 years 
old, medium age firms as those that are between 6 and 10 years old and, old firms as those that 
are more than 11 years old.  
Table 19: Productivity by Age 
TFPQ 
Year  1990 1995 2000 
Between 5 and 10  0.1867 -0.1745 -0.6106 
   [0.2704] [0.1797] [0.3865] 
More than 11  0.4719* 0.0544  0.0518 
   [0.2364] [0.1503] [0.3162] 
TFPR 
Between 5 and 10  -0.0345 -0.0869 -0.4875 
   [0.1538] [0.1156] [0.3919] 
More than 11  -0.0950 -0.2682* -0.3819 
   [0.1000]  [0.1360]  [0.2844] 
      Source: Author’s calculations 
          Note: *** if significative at 1%; ** if significative at 5%; * if significative at 10% 
According to the table, there are no differences in TFPQ, nor in TFPR between firms of 
different ages. Only in 1990, older firms are 47 percent more productive (TFPQ) than the 
industry averages and in 1995 they have 26 percent lower TFPR than the industry averages. 
However these differences are significant only at a 10 percent level.  
Not shown in the table, only in the years 1988 and 1989 we find that older firms are more 
productive in terms of TFPQ than younger firms and these differences are statistically significant 
at a 1 percent level. In terms of TFPR we didn’t find important differences in the whole period. 
These results confirm our hypothesis that most of the distortions that prevailed in Bolivia at the 
beginning of the 80’s if they were not removed, they have been homogenized due to the 
implementation of the NEP. For instance, the NEP liberalized the financial markets and 34 
 
facilitated the build up of a microfinance system that gave access to credit, not only to small 
firms, but also to young and informal firms.
17  
Finally, we present the regressions of TFPQ and TFPR against all the firm characteristics 
considered already and including also a dummy that refers to the region where firms are located. 
This is particularly important for Bolivia, since it is a country that presents huge differences 
between the three main Departments which are La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz and the rest 
of the Departments. The three main Departments are called the Axis. Considering solely the 
infrastructure, these three Departments offer a far better infrastructure than the others, for the 
manufacturing industries, although it is still considered deficient compared with other Latin 
American countries. Therefore we divided firms located in the central axis (the three 
Departments mentioned above) and those located in the rest of the Departments.
18 
Table 20: TFPQ and TFPR with Multiple Covariates 
 TFPQ  TFPR 
Year  1990 1995 2000  1990  1995 2000 
Small  0.5589*** -0.0312  1.5730**  0.0516  -0.3139** 0.6142 
  [0.2019] [0.2221] [0.6531]  [0.1326]  [0.1486] [0.5920] 
Medium  1.0931*** 0.6245** 2.0960***  -0.1620  -0.3775***  0.1282 
  [0.1816] [0.2364] [0.6648]  [0.1511]  [0.1381] [0.4371] 
Large  1.7719*** 1.4994*** 2.6061*** -0.0395  -0.1992  0.0622 
  [0.2108] [0.2954] [0.6138]  [0.1908]  [0.1800] [0.4436] 
Between 5 and 10  0.0661 -0.2567  0.6561**  -0.0148  -0.0757 0.2738 
  [0.2373] [0.1700] [0.3176]  [0.1473]  [0.1153] [0.2778] 
More than 11  0.0568 -0.4538***  1.4838***  -0.0638  -0.2703**  0.9496*** 
  [0.1983] [0.1603] [0.1445]  [0.1099]  [0.1294] [0.1770] 
Export  0.1454 -0.0181 -0.0805  -0.0224  -0.1312 0.1740 
  [0.2240] [0.1474] [0.2117]  [0.1369]  [0.1213] [0.2206] 
Out of the Axis  -0.3604** -0.3321**  -0.2690  -0.1246  -0.0215  0.2072 
  [0.1593] [0.1616] [0.3401]  [0.1105]  [0.1324] [0.3401] 
Constant  -2.0475*** -1.2818*** -3.9581***  0.1265  0.5498***  -0.9522** 
  [0.2374] [0.2436] [0.5725]  [0.1541]  [0.1551] [0.4253] 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: *** if significative at 1%; ** if significative at 5%; * if significative at 10% 
From the table above we can extract our main conclusions of this section. First, it is clear 
that the main characteristic that explains productivity differences in Bolivia is the size of the 
firm. Large firms are undoubtedly more productive in terms of TFPQ. If a firm exports or not 
                                                 
17 Bolivia is considered nowadays a leading country in microfinance in Latin America, and is exporting its know-
how to other countries. (See IDB News: http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/detail.cfm?language=English&id=4570).   
18 The other Departments are: Oruro, Potosi, Tarija, Chuquisaca, Beni and Pando. 35 
 
does not seem to influence productivity. Note that if a firm is not located in the main 
Departments it has a lower TFPQ, although in year 2000, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. The coefficients for age show mixed results. In year 1990 older firms are as 
productive as younger firms, in 1995 they are less productive an in 2000 they are more 
productive. 
Second, looking at the columns for TFPR, it can be seen that apparently only the age of 
the firm can explain TFPR differences, but again the results change. For instance, in the year 
1995 older firms had lower TFPR which means they faced smaller distortions, but in the year 
2000 they display higher TFPR, which means that they face higher distortions. Also in the year 
1995, medium firms faced smaller distortions. Nevertheless, in general we can conclude that 
distortions are independent of the firm’s characteristics, i.e. the market liberalization period and 
its reforms homogenized distortions for all kind of firms. 
 
V.4. Productivity, Output, Employment and Relative Prices 
Finally in this section we want to relate the manufacturing sector analysis of section III with our 
productivity analysis. In particular, we want to see if the process of external openness and the 
structural reforms have contributed to a change in relative prices within the manufacturing 
industry and if these changes have affected the investment, production and employment 
decisions. The analysis is aggregated for the manufacturing sector, based on results by sectors.
19  
We have included only those sectors for which we had production price indexes and those 
sectors for which we had information in all the years. In total we have included 29 sectors which 
are indeed the most representative of the manufacturing industry in Bolivia. For instance we 
have production of meat products, manufacture of grain mill products, manufacture of textiles, 
manufacture of furniture, among others. With the objective mentioned above we analyze the 
correlation between the following variables for the different sectors and averaged for the 
manufacturing industry. 
•  Output 
•  Employment 
•  TFP 
•  TFPQ 
                                                 
19 We leave for another study the analysis of each of the sectors. 36 
 
•  TFPR 
•  Real wages 
•  Relative prices (production prices relative to the industry mean) 
Table 21 displays the correlation matrix of the annual rates of growth of the aforementioned 
variables. The correlations are average values for the different sectors of the industry. Jemio 
(2000) shows a similar matrix, but using the labor productivity as measure of productivity and 
computes the correlations for the years 1987 to 1997. 
Table 21: Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
   Output  Employment  TFP  TFPQ  TFPR  Real Wages 
Relative 
Prices 
Output  1.00                   
Employment  0.51  1.00                
TFP  0.70  0.27  1.00             
TFPQ  0.64  0.27  0.97  1.00          
TFPR  0.34  0.02  0.85  0.87  1.00       
Real Wages  0.63 0.76  0.33  0.31  -0.10  1.00     
Relative 
Prices  -0.15 0.02  -0.09  -0.08  -0.10  0.04  1.00 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note that there is a positive correlation between output variation and TFP variation. The 
coefficient of 0.7 indicates that changes in production are highly correlated with changes in 
productivity. The correlation with TFPQ is slightly smaller (0.64) and the correlation with TFPR 
indicates that changes in output are positively correlated with changes in the level of distortions 
but not as much as with changes in productivity per se. 
The correlations between variation in output and variations in employment and real 
wages are 0.51 and 0.63 respectively. These correlations are much higher than those found by 
Jemio (2000) which were 0.26 and 0.27 respectively. There is also a positive correlation between 
changes in employment and changes in productivity but the coefficient is low (0.27) this means 
that increases in productivity are slightly related to increases in employment. Increases in 
productivity (TFP) are translated also slightly into increases in real wages (0.33) 
We find negative correlations between variations in our three measures of productivity 
and variations in relative prices. Nevertheless, the correlations are not significative. The same 
occurs between variations in relative prices and variations in output. Observe a positive and high 
correlation between variations in employment and in real wages (0.76) which indicates that 
changes in real wages have influenced significantly the levels of employment. In fact real wages 
represent an important proportion of production costs. 37 
 
Lastly, to reinforce our conclusion that there is a positive correlation between output and 
our measures of physical (TFPQ) and revenue productivity (TFPR) we have regressed the log of 
TFPQ relative to the industry mean and the log of TFPR relative to the industry mean on the log 
of PsiYsi which represents value added per firm. The results are shown in the table below for the 
years 1990, 1995 and 2000, to see the evolution of the elasticities during the three periods of 
reforms.  
Table 22: Elasticicites of TFPQ and TFPR with Output 
TFPQ 
Year  1990 1995 2000 
logPsiYsi  0.3360*** 0.2629*** 0.3370*** 
   [0.0531] [0.0717] [0.0633] 
Constant  -5.5392*** -4.6759*** -6.0552*** 
   [0.6377] [1.0000] [0.9598] 
Observations  489 446 325 
R-squared  0.246 0.211 0.311 
TFPR 
logPsiYsi  0.0698*** 0.0339 0.0694*** 
   [0.0218] [0.0233] [0.0258] 
Constant  -0.9681*** -0.4557  -1.0838** 
   [0.3323] [0.3432] [0.4703] 
Observations  489 446 325 
R-squared  0.025 0.008 0.027 
   Source: Author’s calculations 
See that all the elasticities are positive and significative at the 1 percent level. In the years 
of the 2
nd Generation Reforms (1994-1997) only the elasticity of TFPR with output in year 1994 
is significative and has a value of 0.0897. In contrast, in the Post Reforms period (1998-2001) 
only in year 1998 the same elasticity is not significative at any level of significance. The 




A long stream of papers has stressed that misallocation of inputs across firms can reduce 
aggregate productivity in a country. In this paper, we used micro data on manufacturing firms to 
analyze the possible role of such misallocation in Bolivia during the denominated “market 
liberalization” period (1988-2001). There is also ample literature that estimates total factor 
productivity (TFP) and where productivity measures are revenue-based and so they are not 38 
 
necessarily good proxies for firm performance. With this caveat in mind, we have computed TFP 
and analyzed level, growth and dispersion of productivity breaking down this measure of 
productivity in revenue productivity (TFPR) and physical productivity (TFPQ). 
Using the data from the Bolivian Annual Manufacturing Survey we computed these two 
productivity measures, and also the product and capital distortions that explain resource 
misallocation. We applied the same standard monopolistic competition model developed by 
Hsieh and Klenow (2008). One of the main conclusions is that TFP decreased steadily during the 
period 1988 – 2001. TFP growth decreased in -9.3 percent from which 4 percent can be 
attributed to a worst allocation of resources. The new development model introduced by the 
NPE, based in the market forces, did not permit a better allocation of resources that could boost 
productivity in the manufacturing industry, although it allowed increasing exports. 
By performing the same “liberalization” experiments as Hsieh and Klenow (2008), that is 
by removing all distortions, we found that TFP would have risen by 56.2 percent during the 1
st 
Generation Reforms period, by 60.6 percent during the 2
nd Generations Reform period and by 
62.6 percent during the Post reforms period. In fact, in terms of allocative inefficiency Bolivia is 
situated between the U.S. and China and India. Nevertheless, allocative efficiency in Bolivia 
declined in about -5 percent during the period of study. TFP gains relative to the U.S. increased 
from 6.7 percent in 1988 to 12.4 percent in 2001.  
We have analyzed also some particular features of the Bolivian manufacturing sector, 
concentrating in the relation between TFPQ and TFPR. The first conclusion from a regression on 
multiple covariates is that the main characteristic that explains productivity differences in Bolivia 
is the size of the firm. Large firms are clearly more productive in terms of TFP than other sized 
firms. Additionally, productivity differences are sizable and became larger in each of the periods 
of reforms considered. Large firms had 177 percent higher TFPQ than micro firms during the 1
st 
Generation Reforms period and this percentage increased up to 260 percent during the Post 
reforms period. Other characteristics as age, geographical location or exporting condition do not 
seem to influence TFPQ, although in the regressions considering only the relation between TFPQ 
and exporting firms we found that exporting firms were more productive than non-exporting 
firms, but this advantage decreased during time.   
The second conclusion is that distortions measured by TFPR are independent of any of 
the firms’ characteristics. Moreover we found that the market liberalization period and its 39 
 
reforms homogenized distortions for all kind of firms, probably by promoting informality and 
labor flexibility. Certainly the government and policy distortions of the 80s, a result of the State 
involvement in production activities were removed with the market liberalization reforms, but 
market distortions prevailed and became equal across firms.  
We found also that there is a positive and high correlation between output variation and 
changes in productivity. In fact the elasticity of TFPQ with output is statistically significative 
and in the order of 0.32 on average for the whole period. Output variation is also correlated with 
changes in the level of distortions but not as much as with changes in productivity per se. 
Finally, we identified a positive but low correlation between employment and productivity which 
indicates that increases in employment are associated with increases in productivity but not in a 
proportion that could absorb an important amount of employment.  
In sum, the main success of the market liberalization period has been to assign the market 
a fundamental economic role, whose benefits were translated into macroeconomic stability, 
greater transparency for the economic relations and the boost of exports. Certainly, an important 
issue is why the effects of these reforms and the reforms per se have not been sustainable along 
time. As De Gregorio (2008) states, two issues are key for sustainable growth and productivity: 
i) Safe property rights and ii) Adequate structure of remunerations. In other words, this means 
strong institutions. The market liberalization period in Bolivia eliminated policy distortions and 
homogenized market distortions, but governments did not create the institutions that could 
sustain this process. As a reflection, we have a fully liberalized manufacturing sector, but with 
most of firms working under informality or pseudo formality.  
Additionally, even if distortions were removed we see that there are structural problems 
in the manufacturing sector that impedes the increase in productivity. In fact, we found that TFP 
declined steadily during the market liberalization period, actual and potential TFP. In further 
research it would be ideal to do a more in depth analysis of the sectors, and so to infer not only 
the distortions that are behind resource misallocation but also the institutional problems that each 
sector confronts. With these elements probably we would be able to solve the puzzle of why all 
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Appendix 1: The Hsieh and Klenow Model: Distortions and Productivity with Monopolistic 
Competition 
 
This appendix reviews the algebra for the Hsieh and Klenow (2008) model of monopolistic 
competition with heterogeneous firms.  43 
 
Consider an economy, where a representative firm produces the single final good Y. 
Output and factor markets are perfectly competitive and the firm combines the output Ys of S 
















1 θ  (A.1) 
By minimizing costs we obtain: 
PY Y P s s s θ =  (A.2) 

















price of the final good. We assume the final output good as the numeraire, so P=1. 
 




















si Y Y  (A.3) 
Each differentiated product is produced according to a typical Cobb-Douglas production 
function, using capital and labor, and combining them with Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
s s
si si si si wL K A Y
α α − =
1 ) (  (A.4) 
where Capital and labor shares are fixed within an industry, but are different between industries. 
 
Firm profits are given by 
si Ksi si si si Ysi si RK wL Y P ) 1 ( ) 1 ( τ τ π + − − − =  (A.5) 
where w represents the wage rate, R is the rental price of capital, τK is a distortion (tax) that 
increases the marginal product of capital relative to labor, which we call a capital distortion and 
τY  is the distortion (tax) that raises the marginal products of capital and labor by the same 
proportion and we call it the output distortion.  
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=  (A.7) 
Replacing these demands in the production function yields an expression for the firm’s 
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the allocation of labor 
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It is clearly seen that the allocation of resources across firms will not only depend on firm 
TFP levels, but also on the output and capital wedges they face. The fact that resource allocation 
is driven by distortions rather than firm TFP, this will result in differences in the marginal 
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=    (A.13) 
To obtain the TFP per sector (industry), we aggregate the firm-level demands for the two 
factor inputs. Then, we combine the aggregate demand for the factor inputs in each sector with 
the allocation of total expenditure across sectors. 
) 1 ( ) 1 (









































































































τ τ denote the weighted average output and capital 
distortions in sector s.  45 
 








s s s L K TFP Y
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θ α α  (A.16) 






















































si s A TFP  (A.17) 
Notice that TFP in sector s is a weighted average of Asi, where the weights are the firm-
specific capital and output distortions. 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) stress that, when industry deflators are used, 
differences in plant-specific prices show up in the customary measure of plant TFP. Therefore it 
is important to distinguish between “physical productivity” (TFPQ,) and “revenue productivity” 
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Using equations (A.12) and (A.13) we can express also TFPR per firm as a weighted 
























From equation (A.19) it can be seen that TFPR is closely related to the proportion of 
capital and output wedges, in other words TFPR is also a measure of the level of distortions that 



























































A TFP  (A.22) 
where: 
                                                 
















































































































Appendix 2: Correlation between Wedges and Productivity in Bolivia 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculations 
























































































































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculations 48 
 
 
Appendix 3: Robustness Checks 
 
In this appendix we analyze the previous results by performing some sensitivity exercises. In 
particular we check if our results from the “liberalization exercise” change when we modify the 
parameter values used in our calculations.  
Table A 1: TFP Gains of Equalizing TFPR (in percentages) 
  Gains 
10+ employees  1+ employees  10+ employees  10+ employees  10+ employees 
sigma=3 sigma=3 sigma=5 sigma=3  sigma=3 













1988  52.50 53.77 98.58 55.38  43.02 
1989  55.85 57.04 98.88 52.93  53.35 
1990  56.74 58.85 99.87 56.00  46.37 
1991  55.45 56.16 94.64 55.45  56.66 
1992  59.69 62.01  105.96  57.38  53.19 
1993  57.05 59.16  103.28  55.11  48.17 
1994  62.38 61.33  112.59  59.50  58.95 
1995  53.52 54.19 90.91 53.72  50.70 
1996  60.86 62.94  114.27  55.93  47.26 
1997  65.51 66.59  119.55  55.14  43.66 
1998  70.65 72.40  121.17  67.50  49.20 
1999  59.23 61.04 97.20 54.19  45.84 
2000  59.86 60.40  100.84  58.12  48.94 
2001  60.64 60.69 99.79 48.62  47.83 
  Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The Bolivian gains are indeed sensitive to the elasticity of substitution (σ). The gains with σ=5 
are 1.75 times higher, on average.   